Future planetary extravehicular activities (EVAs) will go beyond what was experienced during Apollo.
INTRODUCTION
Human exploration of other planetary surfaces will go beyond our Apollo experience. NASA's current space exploration goals envision people returning to the Moon for stays that are longer than Apollo's, including lunar polar outposts with crew rotations lasting 180 days [1] , similar to future Mars missions. As mission duration becomes longer, planning extravehicular activities (EVAs) will shift from Earth mission control to the surface crew. This will include planning and real-time replanning of EVAs, as we foresee astronauts will need to re-plan in order to deal with the unexpected, an inherent trait of all space exploration. During Apollo, no assistive tools were given to the astronauts on the lunar surface for re-planning tasks. We now have the technological capacity to offer more sophisticated decision support aids for planning and re-planning surface activities.
In order to design robust decision support aids for mission planning, the first step is to characterize surface operations of planetary exploration. This is not a trivial task as future surface operations may consist of advanced technologies (e.g., robotic assistants), different objectives (e.g., acquiring in-situ materials), and a growing wealth of knowledge (e.g., new areas of scientific value). In this paper, we propose a framework that aims to characterize all types of planetary EVAs. It was developed by reviewing Apollo EVAs, conducting an observational study of excursions in a Mars-analog site, and applying part of the framework to a prototype path planner for human planetary exploration.
TYPES OF PLANETARY EVA
We propose that all types of planetary EVAs are captured in the following framework ( Figure 1 ). The framework organizes and sets up relationships between the various parameters and constraints that affect or determine the planning and re-planning of an EVA. When planning any planetary EVA, many factors need to be identified and specified, such as who is doing the EVA, what are they doing, and how are they getting there. For the Planetary EVA Framework, these factors have been organized into broad parameters, like astroagents, sites, and transportation, respectively. Each EVA has to operate within limits and constraints, defined by the parameters themselves.
For example, the Exploration Cost of time is not the constraint itself, but rather the amount of carried oxygen bounds total maximum EVA time. The items in the framework are purposefully broad to encompass the plethora of excursions possible, yet each individual parameter or constraint can be specified. For instance, the parameter astro-agents, which describes who is conducting the EVA excursion, can be an astronaut, as in the Apollo program, a robot, as the current Mars explorers, or a combination of these, as is foreseen for future planetary missions. Further details about the framework will be elaborated in the Discussion section.
The planetary EVA framework focuses on a single excursion as opposed to a mission, which would be a set of multiple sorties. It is important to point this out because within a set of excursions, not all EVAs are created equal. The relative importance between individual EVAs may be different; some may be mission critical and thus, accomplished first. However, the planning of each will be same.
For this framework, we have assessed the types of EVA architectures that have occurred and are proposed for future human planetary exploration. During Apollo, exploration was limited to a maximum stay of 3 days, two astronauts in bulky spacesuits, and the occasional use of a lunar rover. Areas explored were within a few kilometers. Future stays on other planetary surfaces will range from seven days to 180 days, with up to four sorties per week. NASA is considering lunar missions where up to four astronauts are traversing simultaneously on the surface of the Moon [1] , taking advantage of pressurized or un-pressurized rovers and assistant robots that may help them carry supplies or scout upcoming terrain. Their mission goals will range from accomplishing scientific objectives to Mars-forward technology testing. On Mars, crews will have to adapt to changing environmental conditions, such as dust storms and lighting conditions. While varied, all EVAs have a shared underlying structure, which we have organized in the proposed framework.
The length of the mission also affects the manner in which an EVA is planned and re-planned. When the duration is short, the criticality of accomplishing the EVA increases, and, arguably, crews will be more willing to take risks for mission success. However, when the duration is long, astronauts are risk adverse as it is more likely to be able to return to sites or re-attempt tasks. Future human exploration will likely be more similar to the exploration conducted by the current Mars Exploration Rovers. These rovers have spent over a Martian year traversing, and their next "EVA" is daily determined by the previous set of information that has been gathered by past excursions. Similarly, human sorties will have to address past exploration. Yet the task of planning and re-planning of excursions remains the same.
The purpose of the Planetary EVA Framework is to be as comprehensive as possible, so that individual excursions that will meet mission goals can be defined, regardless of complexity, relative importance, and mission duration.
APOLLO EXPERIENCE: LESSONS LEARNED
Every Apollo mission that landed on the Moon included at least one EVA. In the first few missions, the EVAs had more of an engineering test flight "flavor." The EVAs performed during the latter half of the Apollo missions were more geared towards exploration that addressed scientific hypotheses. Extensive preparation was undertaken in order to maximize scientific return. Each site and task was prioritized based on its relative importance to the overall scientific mission goal. Routes and estimated travel times were established using lowresolution photographic images and crude topographic maps. They also allocated finite times to the scientific tasks [2] .
In every planetary EVA mission, astronaut crews had to deal with the unexpected. Their list of activities was long, and while planning, they assumed that some would not get accomplished. Most activities or sites were dropped due to lack of time, which is the underlying recurring theme among the planetary EVAs.
Estimates for some of the planned activities were poor, typically requiring additional time, affecting the rest of the schedule. During Apollo 11, preparation times were optimistic [3] , delaying the start of the first EVA on the Moon. Delayed start times, which in turn reduced the length of subsequent EVAs, happened on Apollo 15 and 16 as these missions landed later than expected. Sleep periods were rearranged so that astronauts would be rested when on the lunar surface [6] . Occasionally, deploying equipment, like the Lunar Rover Vehicle (LRV), was time-consuming, or worse, the equipment could fail or work inappropriately. For example, drilling on the Moon was difficult and took longer than expected for astronauts in Apollo 15 and 17. Any additional time beyond what was budgeted to accomplish tasks, as small as they may be, collectively resulted in changing the EVA.
Schedules were also affected by how much time was spent along path segments, which are inherently linked to the type of transportation the astronauts were using. During Apollo, two methods of transportation were used: walking and driving the LRV. Apollo spacesuits were critical for survival, but they were also bulky, slowing down astronauts. They can also fail, like any piece of equipment. During Apollo 15, one astronaut was leaking oxygen at a faster rate than expected [6] , resulting in a shortened EVA.
The longest "walking" EVA occurred during Apollo 14, where astronauts had to reach Cone Crater, a destination they never quite reached [5, 7, 8, 9] . With only a map in hand (Figure 2 ), encumbered by a bulky, life support system, astronauts had to traverse an unfamiliar environment, unaware of their deviations from the planned path. Astronauts had poor situation awareness of their location that resulted from inadequate surface contrast, lighting conditions, and monochromatic terrain. In addition, astronauts had traversed terrain that resulted in high metabolic rates and increased heart rates, requiring extra rest stops. Having fallen behind on their schedule and unable to accurately determine the edge of Cone Crater, the true destination site was abandoned and astronauts had to settle for another site. The later Apollo missions had a rover (LRV, Figure 3 ), which allowed astronauts to traverse longer distances, but additional concerns arose. Lighting conditions were still important; Apollo 16 astronauts commented on driving slower because low sun angles made it difficult to estimate sizes (e.g., crater sizes) and distances [6] . The LRV was yet another piece of equipment that could have technical difficulties, such as a "down" navigation system (Apollo 16) and a lack of power steering (Apollo 15). The introduction of the rover to the EVAs imposed a stricter walk-back requirement since astronauts were much farther away from the lunar module (LM). There were increased time pressures at the farthest sites, occasionally preventing further exploration of that area. Such is the case during Apollo 17, when astronauts found "orange soil". This led to an unplanned core sample [6] . While the crew was able to accomplish the task, they used up all their time for that site. Under this constraint, even getting on and off the LRV was a significant portion of time. Once on the LRV, the boost of traversing speed relieved the walk-back constraint until the next stop.
Finally, additional environmental constraints affected general performance, and thus, efficiency. During Apollo, the two most present were lighting conditions (in conjunction with the lack of atmosphere) and dust. For example, Apollo 12 astronauts mentioned lighting conditions made it difficult to properly assess rock samples [4] . Lunar dust affected all equipment, resulting in deteriorated performance. Space suits were very dusty after only three uses, in most cases.
IMPLICATIONS OF APOLLO EXPERIENCE
The successful completion of each planetary EVA during Apollo is a great feat. What we have learned from this experience is that we must prepare for the unexpected and that even small problems accumulate over time. There is a clear need to develop and provide crews with re-planning decision support aids. During Apollo, a large, earth-based operational crew supported the astronauts; for longer missions, responsibilities will shift to surface-based astronauts. Furthermore, real-time decision aids will provide astronauts the flexibility to conduct true exploration.
MARS-ANALOG EXCURSIONS
An observational study of excursions was conducted at the NASA Haughton-Mars Project (HMP), a terrestrial Mars-analog research site set in an uninhabited island, high in the Canadian Arctic. We propose that excursions conducted at this site resemble sorties of long-duration planetary space missions because HMP is located in a remote, extreme environment, where scientists return yearly for several weeks to carry out their research objectives. Assessing and reviewing HMP excursions can provide insight to the potential problems astronauts may face in future planetary EVAs.
During the 2005 season, eight excursions (Table 1) were categorized through an "EVA Log". The log permitted a systematic assessment of each excursion, though these were varied. For example, one traversal was conducted by two geologists on foot to a near-by, known location while another included a large group on all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to an unexplored destination.
For each "EVA Log", the traverse leader described the following parameters that described their excursion: goals, total estimated time, participants, number of sites visited, type of mobility to sites, estimated distances between sites, and expected environmental factors that could affect excursion. Additionally, an inventory of supplies was recorded and the excursion planning session was summarized. After the excursion was performed, the leaders' debrief included unexpected events that resulted in re-planning.
CASE STUDY: EXCURSION INTO HAUGHTON CRATER
One HMP excursion (#3 in Table 1 ) is described in detail below in order to illustrate a traversal and its similarities to Moon and Mars sorties.
This excursion into the middle Haughton Crater was the first of the 2005 season, and rare, as special permission is required to enter the crater.
There were four participants in this excursion, of which three were experienced scientists that had visited the area many times in previous years.
Each of these three researchers had a clear objective: taking gravity measurements at multiple sites, conducting gully survey, or collecting soil samples at one particular site. The fourth person in the excursion was a safety officer (necessary protection in case of polar bears -a hazard exclusive to Arctic exploration).
A couple of hours before the start of the excursion, all participants gathered to finalize the plans. While the traverse leader was in charge of the meeting, there was open communication between all the parties involved. Each researcher outlined his objectives for the traverse, identifying specific sites they wished to reach. Furthermore, each site was prioritized. They used maps, both topographic and aerial, to work out a feasible route. This was accomplished rather quickly as all three scientists had previously undertaken similar routes in past seasons. Hence, they were also able to anticipate a few locations along the path that would be difficult to navigate. The meeting ended with safety considerations, securing that essential items, like radios and ATVs, were in place.
The participants initially planned to visit six sites using the ATVs (Figure 4) . During the planning session, the scientists delineated which sites were most critical and necessary, and settled on a preliminary route to follow (Figure 4 ). The traverse leader estimated a total of 4 to 5 hours to complete the excursion, based on the number sites, estimated time to reach each and time spent at each site. Additionally, this excursion was also unusual in the respect that there was a real time pressure element. Two of the researchers were leaving HMP that evening on a flight that could not be delayed. Most excursions at HMP did not have this time pressure as there was no real cost involved with returning to camp late. A detailed inventory of their supplies was recorded. Their supplies fell under three categories, which were common to all excursions at HMP: excursion, critical and scientific supplies. Excursion supplies included lunch, while critical supplies were items that were related to safety, such radios and repair tools for their mobility (i.e., ATV) like a tire pump. Scientific equipment directly mapped to the objectives of each researcher, and encompassed gravimeter, cameras, hand-held GPS receiver, and sampling tools.
After the excursion (Figure 5 ), the traverse leader discussed events that triggered re-planning. Due to the wet weather earlier that season, the ground bearing strength of certain areas had decreased, making it very difficult to drive over. The traverse leader estimated that they had spent all together over an hour extricating their ATVs from two locations.
These locations were relatively early in the route and not the anticipated problem areas either (in fact they had not reached these yet). The excursion participants were left to re-assess their plan and schedule. The researchers had not arrived to an essential site, Old Base Camp, which was the only site where soil samples were to be collected. It was determined that the ground bearing strength along the rest of the path leading to that site was too weak to support their ATVs. They considered walking the distance to Old Base Camp, about 5 km, however, the additional time incurred by attempting this would delay their return to the HMP Camp and likely result in missing the evening flight. They finally opted for an alternative route to Old Base Camp. Unfortunately, due to the researchers' miscalculation on the terrain, they were unable to reach their destination.
Thus, for this traversal, the researchers left out the essential site, in hopes that a future opportunity may arise to return and collect the necessary samples.
Later on during the excursion, the participants were not able to reach the Anomaly Hill site on ATV (again, due to terrain uncertainty). They were able to reach the site though by foot, as they were only 1 km away from their destination. While this was time consuming, it was still feasible within their time constraints. Eventually, they all returned to camp in time for the two departing scientists to catch their flight. The excursion (summarized on Figure 4 ) took a total time of about six hours.
IMPLICATIONS FROM MARS-ANALOG EXCURSIONS
There are many important analogies that can be drawn from HMP excursions. These traversals are more complex than Apollo EVAs, involving a greater number of people, trekking farther and through much more difficult terrain. Yet, similar problems arise, such as leveraging different types of mobility and incurring delays due to terrain uncertainty. While, HMP is an established ground research site, and though remote, does not necessitate life critical equipment such as spacesuits. Nevertheless, HMP scientists would benefit from replanning decision aids, particularly for exploring new areas. Furthermore, HMP is an ideal place to test these aids, gaining EVA operational experience.
APPLYING FRAMEWORK TO PLANETARY DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
From a cognitive perspective, the task of planetary EVA planning and re-planning is challenging. Decision support computer aids will assist astronauts in managing navigation, physiologic-, and mission-specific information. Managing all this information and balancing competing goals becomes increasingly difficult during real-time EVA re-planning, where time is a precious commodity. In order to investigate how best humans and computers can collaborate within this task, we have developed a prototype path planner named PATH [10] (Planetary Aid for Traversing Humans). By understanding how people conduct multivariate, complex optimizations, we will be able to design more robust and useful decision support aids.
With PATH (Figure 6 ), users are able to plan paths with minimal cost under different objective functions, such as distance, time, metabolic cost, and lighting conditions. The terrain map displayed is the area explored by astronauts during Apollo 14. Obstacles are slopes that are too steep for suited astronauts to climb. Users can make paths and modify them by adding, deleting, and moving waypoints of the path. We have developed two variants of PATH, the difference being how the user chooses the optimal path. In one version (active automation), the user only decides on an intermediate point of a path and the automation finds and plots least-costly paths to that point. The numerical potential field method [11, 12] was implemented in order to calculate the automated paths; path costs are based on an objective cost function. In the other version (passive automation), the user takes a more important role, deciding all the waypoints within a path. Once the user outlines their route, PATH calculates the path's cost, based on the objective function. Users are able to iterate on multiple paths, until they achieve a minimum cost. In order to understand how these two levels of automation affected path planning performance, we tested these variants in an experiment. Performance was measured with respect to path cost error (how much over the optimal cost), time to complete path, and the number of correctly answered situational awareness questions.
Twenty-seven volunteer subjects completed multiple paths with both active and passive automation. After each path, they were asked situational awareness questions that addressed elements of the display and how well they integrated their knowledge of the cost functions and other information. For this first experiment, we tested cost functions that were only related to lighting conditions, as they are novel.
When comparing subjects' performance, we found that subjects had significantly larger cost errors and took longer time when using the passive automation variant in contrast to when using the active automation. The active automation saved, on average, about 1.5 minutes, which may be indispensable for time critical tasks. However, increased performance came at the cost of significantly decreased situational awareness for active automation. During passive automation, most subjects correctly answered 75% or more of the questions as compared to active automation, where less than half achieved this. Finally, while lighting condition cost functions were unusual to all subjects, most were able to find paths within 25% of the optimal.
IMPLICATIONS OF PROTOTYPE PATH
Attempting to apply the complex, proposed framework will inevitably reveal the "missing holes" in our overall knowledge of EVA mission planning.
We have implemented only a subsection of our framework, and we have realized that there are few, if any, operational models, such as traversal duration, ideal lighting conditions, and metabolic consumption as a function of terrain. By testing PATH, we are able to investigate the cognitive challenges and human-computer interaction that is appropriate for planning and re-planning decision support aids. While we have shown that manually users can optimize path to within 25%, it remains for operational requirements to define if this is adequate.
DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PLANETARY DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
The proposed framework (Figure 1 ) for planetary EVAs was derived based on the previous three case studiesApollo sorties, HMP excursions, and a prototype implementation of a planetary path planner. We have organized parameters and constraints that affect and determine the planning and re-planning of future planetary sorties. In order to develop robust decision support aids for such an endeavor, each parameter and constraint should be modeled or operational knowledge should be gained.
Each individual planetary EVA results in a plan (visited sites and path segments between these) and a schedule (times at sites and along segments). Overall, we need to be able to predict the other exploration costs associated to each site and path segment as they too can affect the time. For instance, Apollo core sampling was an energetic and time-consuming task; any unexpected samples, like in Apollo 17 with the "orange soil", pushed the limits of allocated times for that site. We have identified three other main exploration costs (aside from distance and time): energy used, consumables expended, and favorable sun positions. Every plan should also include "pre-planned" contingencies, so astronauts can quickly execute these if needed.
The inputs of a planetary EVA are the parameters and constraints. The sites on a planetary EVA are essential, as they drive the planning of each sortie. Location, associate tasks, and priority are key characteristics of each site. Site prioritization was done during the Apollo planning of EVAs and also played an important role during re-planning during the HMP Haughton Crater excursion. Additionally, we need reliable estimates for the exploration costs (in particular time and energy consumed) and the learning curve in accomplishing that task. For example, the first time a drill was used in Apollo, it was an arduous job resulting in increased metabolic rates, yet subsequent missions had an easier time. Finally, we need to account for "extra" sites, such as rest stops or operational stops (e.g., recalibration of navigation system).
We realize that astronauts and robots (astro-agents) will explore the surfaces of Moon and Mars, and hence, mission planners need to clearly recognize the capabilities, expertise, and experience of each. Moreover, understanding the effects of having mixed teams will be crucial: does the robot slow the astronaut down? Do they travel separately or together? Robotic assistants may be in charge of different aspects of the EVA mission, even only specific sites, for example.
The Planetary EVA Framework has identified four general constraints or limits that bound each planetary excursion: mobility constraints, operational constraints, safety requirements, and total astro-agent consumables. Each of these constraints is inherently linked to the architecture of the mission (i.e., the type of transportation, the communication and navigation system, and the "home base" in place) and the planetary environment being explored. While the consumable limits determine the maximum of activities, the activities themselves must also take into account imposed operation constraints. Perhaps future EVAs will not permit exploration of areas that are out of communication range. Additionally, planners may add in required rest stops and safety, margin time to the excursion. As we gain planetary operational experience, these constraints will undoubtedly increase.
The framework identifies transportation as a parameter that is naturally associated with mobility constraints. Transportation includes locomotion options (e.g., walking or driving), preparation times, transportation reliability (e.g., of spacesuit or rover), and transportation-specific characteristics (factors such as maximum traversable rock density, slope, speed, and fuel rate consumption). The transportation utilized in turn determines terrain areas that are impassable, unfavorable, or inaccessible. Considering the trade-offs between locomotion options is a crucial component of real time re-planning EVA, as exemplify by the Haughton Crater excursion. With respect to Apollo, engineers imposed conservative estimates for the walk-back constraint because they had only a basic appreciation of the interaction between the spacesuit and the terrain. Transportation is a key element in all planetary EVAs, and the advantages of different locomotion options need to be exploited to maximize mission success.
The terrain plays such an important role in mission planning and re-planning as it is one of the main sources of uncertainty, as exemplified in Apollo EVAs and HMP excursions. Future planetary exploration will exploit all the remotely sensed information about the terrain, such as topography, morphology, and chemical composition. Vital characteristics of the terrain, with respect to EVAs, are terrain slope, rock density, rock size, and ground bearing strength. This data will assist in determining terrain obstacles; PATH's obstacles are purely based on slope, yet there could be obstacles that could be a function of other terrain characteristics. Decreasing terrain uncertainty can be achieved by updating our knowledge of the terrain, which will occur naturally with longer duration missions.
Environmental uncertainties will be more predominant on Mars, as there are, for example, wind or dust storms that could affect EVAs. The Moon, lacking an atmosphere, does not pose that problem, yet there are issues with lighting conditions and its effect on astronaut's visibility, and possibly, solar radiation events that would prevent lunar explorers from completing their EVA.
All the parameters and constraints discussed above are needed to plan future planetary EVAs. With respect to real-time decision support aids, additional functionality is desirable. Under time pressure, astronauts should be able to change their EVA to accommodate unexpected events and furthermore, assess the advantages and disadvantages of these changes. They ought to be capable of judging if path and schedule deviations have been incurred and if these are life threatening.
Lastly, the longer humans stay on another planetary surface, planning strategies will shift from firm to adaptive plans.
New information, gathered during previous EVAs, will guide what the crew will do next. It will be critical to design decision support systems that permit the incorporation of new data, from higher fidelity terrain models to the discovery of new in-situ materials to location of recently placed communication beacon.
CONCLUSION
Before sending humans to explore Moon and Mars, we need to have a clear understanding of the relationships between parameters and constraints across all type of planetary EVA architectures. Acquisition of this knowledge will not only serve the purpose of developing EVA planning decision support aids but also modeling future planetary surface operations with implications for logistics mission planning.
The proposed Planetary EVA Framework is the first step in establishing a common ground to discuss human-led extravehicular activities. While additional specification with respect to the parameters and constraints is possible, we can already use the framework to assess for example, different EVA architectures and optimize scientific return for particular sorties. We can go a long way with respect to specifications by further analyzing Apollo experiences, applying known models to prototype systems and testing them in analog sites, such as HMP. We have chosen to apply the framework to planning and re-planning decision support aids. This process has identified the lack of high fidelity models, both physical and terrain, and has led us to investigate humancomputer collaboration for real-time path planning on the Moon. Further experimentation is under-way with PATH, assessing user performance with more complex exploration cost functions and various collaborative visualization displays. With respect to short-term lunar surface exploration, the Planetary EVA Framework could facilitate the preparation of EVAs, in order to maximize mission and scientific success. Planners will need to analyze the trades between different EVAs, assessing the costs and benefits. By first delineating all the parameters and constraints and their relationships, we can design more robust decision support aids to assist in the complex evaluation of EVA planning. Furthermore, the need for a re-planning tool is evident from our experience with Apollo; had the astronauts of Apollo 14 had such an aid, they might have reached Cone Crater. With respect to future long-duration planetary exploration (Figure 7) , NASA already envisions astronauts becoming more independent from Earth, necessitating information systems that assist surface explorers with their tasks and EVAs. Our proposed framework thus will help in the planning and re-planning of future EVAs, encompassing a variety of EVA architectures.
